Danny Elfman Can’t Shake Defamation Suit From Composer

Defamation cases often force courts to balance two competing interests: a person’s right to protect their reputation and another person’s right to speak freely. In this case, the California Court of Appeal had to decide whether composer Danny Elfman’s public statements denying sexual misconduct allegations were protected speech or whether they were defamatory enough to be decided by a jury. The lawsuit was brought by musician and film composer Nomi Abadi after Rolling Stone published an article containing statements from Elfman and his representatives about Abadi. Elfman denied allegations that Abadi made about him (e.g. indecent exposure and inappropriate touching), and claimed that Abadi was motivated by jealousy, wanted to break up his marriage, and sought money after he rejected her. Abadi alleged that these statements were false, damaged her reputation, and negatively affected her career.

Elfman moved to dismiss the lawsuit under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that his comments were protected speech because they addressed a matter of public interest. Anti-SLAPP laws are intended to prevent lawsuits that discourage or punish constitutionally protected speech. Because the statements were made in response to allegations involving a public figure (himself) and published in a national magazine, Elfman argued that the lawsuit should be dismissed. On May 27, 2026, The California Court of Appeal disagreed. The court explained that an anti-SLAPP motion is not meant to determine who is telling the truth or resolve factual disputes at an early stage. Instead, the court must decide whether the plaintiff has presented enough evidence to potentially succeed at trial. The court cited Collins v. Waters, stating, “we must accept the plaintiff’s evidence at this preliminary stage and not resolve credibility disputes or evidentiary conflicts.” Applying that standard, the court found that Abadi had presented enough evidence for a reasonable jury to potentially rule in her favor, allowing most of her defamation claims to proceed.

One of the central legal issues was actual malice. In defamation law, actual malice means making a statement while knowing it is false or with reckless disregard for whether it is true or false (and/or with malicious motives or purpose). The court concluded that some of Elfman’s comments went beyond simply denying the allegations. By making additional factual claims about Abadi’s motives, the court found that a jury could ultimately decide that Elfman’s statements were made with actual malice. The court also rejected much of Elfman’s defense that his responses to Rolling Stone were protected by the “litigation privilege.” Although his attorneys initially sent their responses in a confidential letter, portions of that correspondence were clearly intended to be published as “on-the-record” statements. Because they were directed to the media rather than solely within the context of litigation, the privilege did not automatically apply.

Finally, the court found that Abadi had presented sufficient evidence of damages. She claimed that after the Rolling Stone article was published, opportunities to work with producers and directors declined significantly, supporting her argument that the allegedly defamatory statements harmed her professional reputation. Ultimately, the court held that most of Abadi’s claims should be decided by a jury rather than dismissed at an early stage. The decision reinforces that while individuals have the right to publicly defend themselves against accusations, that may end up getting them sued for defamation.